

# **Cascade-constrained ACOPF**

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# Outline

Introduction

Probability model

Optimization model

Numerical experiments

# Introduction



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# Motivation



## Scheduling electrical generation

- ▶ Critical for safe planning and operation of the grid
- ▶ Growing complexity of the grid makes this problem more pronounced

## Challenges

- ▶ Set points can be susceptible to failure in ways that are not well understood
- ▶ Component outages don't propagate locally in grid topology
- ▶ Need to resolve complex interactions amongst components (dynamics, ACPF)

# Existing approaches

**Cascade models**

**Cascade mitigation**

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(simulations + historical data might only be able to influence **long-term** decision making)

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- ▶ Protective (before a contingency): ensure grid security against a list of particular contingencies ( $N - 1$ ,  $N - k$ )

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## Cascade mitigation

- ▶ Protective (before a contingency): ensure grid security against a list of particular contingencies ( $N - 1$ ,  $N - k$ )
- ▶ Corrective (after a contingency): generation re-dispatch, load shed, protective islanding

# Existing approaches (cont'd)

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$$\mathcal{R}: y \rightarrow \mathcal{R}(y)$$

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# Proposed approach

## Thermodynamics-inspired protective model

- ▶ Explicit surrogate for cascade risk  $\mathcal{R}$  based on the operating state's "potential energy" difference
- ▶ Incorporate  $\mathcal{R}$  into ACOPF and influence the energy surface by the changing generation schedule




Figure: Energy landscape schematic.



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


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


Figure: Energy landscape schematic.

**Goal:** limit the probability of single-component failures within a control horizon (similar to  $N - 1$ )

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


Figure: Energy landscape schematic.

**Question:** how effective is controlling the risk of single-component failure for controlling cascade risk?

# Proposed approach (cont'd)

## Roadmap:

1. “Lower level” state space, model, and optimization (Probability model section)
2. “Upper level” state space, model, optimization, and merging of lower level model (Optimization model section)
3. Numerical experiments using “KMC” a related cascade tool to simulate cascades based on a similar notion of system “energy” (Numerical experiments section)

# Probability model

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# Power transmission network model

## Model

- ▶  $\mathcal{N} = \{1, 2, \dots, n_b\} = \mathcal{N}' \cup \mathcal{G}$  denotes the set of non-generator and generator buses and
- ▶  $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{N}$  denotes the set of transmission lines
- ▶ System state space  $\subseteq \mathbb{R}^{2n_b}$  where each bus  $i$  has
  - ▶ two “unknowns”:  $V_i$  and  $\theta_i$
  - ▶ two equations:  $p_{net,i} = \hat{p}_{net,i}(V, \theta)$  and  $q_{net,i} = \hat{q}_{net,i}(V, \theta)$
  - ▶  $p_{net,i} := p_{d,i} - p_{g,i}$  and  $q_{net,i} := q_{d,i} - q_{g,i}$




Figure: IEEE 30-bus system

## Assumptions

- ▶  $V_i$  and  $p_{g,i}$  are controllable if  $i$  is a generator
- ▶  $p_{d,i}$  and  $q_{d,i}$  are known if  $i$  is a non-generator
- ▶ Lossless transmission lines + ACPF equations
- ▶ Balance eq.  $\sum_i p_{net,i} = 0$  and a “slack” bus at index  $i = \sigma$

# Power transmission network model

- ▶ State space: collect  $V_i$  at non-generator buses and  $\theta_i$  at non-slack buses in the state vector

$$x = (\{V_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{N}'}, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \{\sigma\}}) \in \mathbb{R}^d, \quad d = |\mathcal{N}'| + |\mathcal{N}| - 1 \quad (1)$$

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- ▶ Parameters: collect the remaining voltages and net active and reactive powers

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- ▶ How  $x$  changes over time is described by an SDE

$$dx_t^\tau = (J - S)\nabla_x \mathcal{H}(x_t^\tau, y)dt + \sqrt{2\tau S}dW_t \quad (3)$$

for an “energy-function”  $\mathcal{H} : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ , system quantities  $J, S$ , and Brownian motions  $dW_t$  with variance  $\tau$

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
- ▶ Energy function (first integral of dynamics)

$$\mathcal{H}(x, y) := \frac{1}{2}(V \circ e^{i\theta})^* Y (V \circ e^{i\theta}) + p_{net}^\top \theta + q_{net}^\top \log(V) \quad (4)$$

# Failure model

- ▶ Any local energy minimizer  $\bar{x}(y) := \arg \min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^d} \mathcal{H}(x, y)$  solves the power flow equations and can be taken as a dispatch point
- ▶ Query the system for the first time that an observable  $(\Theta(x_t^\tau, y))$  of the system exceeds a threshold  $(\Theta^{\max})$
- ▶ Phrase as a mean first-passage time problem

$$T_{\partial D}^\tau := \inf\{t > 0 : \Theta(x_t^\tau, y) \geq \Theta^{\max}\}$$



# Failure model (cont'd)

We can consider  $\Theta(x, y)$  to denote various quantities of interest, for example...

- ▶ ...under-voltage violation:  $\Theta(x, y) = -V_i$ ,  $\Theta_i^{\max} = -V_i^{\text{trip}}$
- ▶ ...exceedance of apparent power flow rating:  
 $\Theta_l(x, y) = (s_{p,l})^2 + (s_{q,l})^2$ ,  $\Theta_l^{\max} = (s_l^{\text{trip}})^2$
- ▶ ...exceedance of current flow ( $I$ ) rating for line  $l = (i, j)$ :  $\Theta(x, y) := |B_{i,j}|^2 (V_i^2 + V_j^2 - 2V_iV_j \cos(\theta_i - \theta_j))$ ,  $\Theta_l^{\max} = (I_l^{\text{trip}})^2$

And each describe a safety region  $D(y)$ , failure boundary  $\partial D_l(y)$ , and failure region  $D_l^c(y) := \mathbb{R}^d \setminus D_l(y)$  for

$$D_l(y) := \{x \in \mathbb{R}^d : \Theta_l(x, y) < \Theta_l^{\max}\}$$
$$\partial D_l(y) := \{x \in \mathbb{R}^d : \Theta_l(x, y) = \Theta_l^{\max}\}.$$

# Computing $\mathcal{R}(y)$ in closed form

- ▶ Specifies distribution of failure times  $T_{\partial D}^{\tau} \sim \text{Exp}(\lambda)$  governed by failure rate parameter  $\lambda = 1/\mathbb{E}[T_{\partial D}^{\tau}]$

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- ▶ Relates  $\mathbb{E}[T_{\partial D}^\tau]$  to an explicitly computable function of the state space

$$\lim_{\tau \rightarrow 0} \tau \log \mathbb{E}T_{\partial D}^\tau = \min_{x \in \partial D} \mathcal{H}(\bar{x}(y), y) - \mathcal{H}(x^*(y), y), \quad (5)$$

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$$\lim_{\tau \rightarrow 0} \tau \log \mathbb{E}T_{\partial D_l}^\tau = \min_{x \in \partial D_l} \mathcal{H}(\bar{x}(y), y) - \mathcal{H}(x^*(y), y), \quad (5)$$

- ▶ Can compute subexponential correction to  $\lambda$ , by a Laplace approximation at the “most-likely” failure point

$$x_l^*(y) := \arg \min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^d} \{ \mathcal{H}(x, y) : \Theta_l(x, y) = \Theta_l^{\max} \}, \quad (6)$$



# Failure rate for line $l$

Failure rate:

◀ computation

◀ determinants

$$\lambda_l^\tau(y) \underset{\tau \rightarrow 0}{\sim} \text{pf}_l(y) \times \text{ef}_l(y) \quad (7)$$

$$\text{pf}_l(y) := \nabla^\top \mathcal{H}_l^*(y) S \nabla \mathcal{H}_l^*(y) \sqrt{\frac{\det \nabla_{xx}^2 \mathcal{H}(\bar{x}, y)}{2\pi\tau B_l^*(y)}} \quad (8)$$

$$\text{ef}_l(y) := \exp \left[ -\frac{\mathcal{H}(x_l^*, y) - \mathcal{H}(\bar{x}, y)}{\tau} \right], \quad (9)$$

where  $\nabla \mathcal{H}_l^*(y)$  and  $B_l^*(y)$  (a factor accounting for the curvature of  $\partial D_l(y)$  in the vicinity of  $x^*$ ) are given by:

$$\nabla \mathcal{H}_l^*(y) := \nabla_x \mathcal{H}(x_l^*, y) \quad (10)$$

$$B_l^*(y) := \nabla^\top \mathcal{H}_l^*(y) \text{adj}(L_l(y)) \nabla \mathcal{H}^*(y) \quad (11)$$

$$L_l(y) := \nabla_{xx}^2 \mathcal{H}(x_l^*, y) - \mu_l \nabla_{xx}^2 \Theta_l(x_l^*, y), \quad (12)$$

and  $\mu_l \in \mathbb{R}$  is the Lagrange multiplier in the constraint defining  $x^*$

# Risk for line $l$

**Risk:**

$$\mathcal{R}(y) := \mathbb{P}(T_{\partial D_l}^T(y) \leq t_H) = 1 - \exp[-\lambda_l^T(y)t_H] \quad (13)$$

for time horizon of interest  $t_H$

# Optimization model

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# Conceptual outline

- ▶ Each  $y$  (implicitly) determines the values of  $x$  through the power flow equations
- ▶ Introduce “lower level” optimization variables  $x$  to make this relationship explicit
- ▶ Determine the best vector  $y$  subject to constraining the probability of line failure, shedding load if required

# Optimization formulation

We begin with traditional ACOPF

$$\min_{x, y} \quad c(y) = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{G}} c_k(p_{g,k}) \quad (14a)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad V_i^{\min} \leq V_i \leq V_i^{\max} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{G} \quad (14b)$$

$$V_i^{\min} \leq V_i \leq V_i^{\max} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \mathcal{G} \quad (14c)$$

$$\theta_i^{\min} \leq \theta_i \leq \theta_i^{\max} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N} \quad (14d)$$

$$\Theta(x, y) \leq (I^{\max})^2 \quad \forall l \in \mathcal{L} \quad (14e)$$

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Next specify a time horizon  $t_H$  and risk threshold  $\epsilon^{\text{lim}}$  to constrain the risk for each line  $l \in \mathcal{L}$

$$\mathcal{R}(y, x(y)) = \mathbb{P}(T_{\partial D_l}^T(y) \leq t_H) = 1 - \exp[-\lambda_l^T(y)t_H] \leq \epsilon^{\text{lim}} \quad (15)$$

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In principle, we can also explicitly limit the probability of *sequences* of line failures by considering increasingly nested problems...but leads to same combinatorial issues as in  $N - k$

# Computation

## Challenges

1. Solving a nested optimization problem for  $x^*(y)$
2. Encoding constraints with determinants of large matrices (recall the failure rate prefactor `prefactor`)

## Efficient computation steps

1. Reformulate the  $\mathcal{R}$  constraint(s)
2. Incorporate the nested  $x^*(y)$  problem into the top level
3. Address high-dimensional determinants
4. Implement practical considerations

# Constraint reformulation (step 1)

1. Low rank factorization of  $\Theta_l$  for fixed line  $l$ :

$$\nabla_{x,x}^2 \Theta_l(x, y) = Q_l(x, y) C_l(x, y) Q_l^\top(x, y)$$

where  $Q_l(x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times r}$  (and  $r \ll m$ ) and  $C_l(x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^{r \times r}$  diagonal

2. Taylor approximation:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{H}(x_l^*, y) &\approx \mathcal{H}(\bar{x}, y) + \nabla_x^\top \mathcal{H}(\bar{x}, y)(x_l^* - \bar{x}) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2}(x_l^* - \bar{x})^\top \nabla_{xx}^2 \mathcal{H}(\bar{x}, y)(x_l^* - \bar{x}) \end{aligned}$$

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### Specifically...

$$\nabla_{xx}^2 \mathcal{H}(\bar{x}, y)(x_l^* - \bar{x}) = \mu_l \nabla_x \Theta_l(x_l^*, y) \quad (16)$$

$$\Theta_l(x_l^*, y) = \Theta_l^{\max} \quad (17)$$

$$\mu_l \rho(A_l) < 1, \quad (18)$$

where  $A_l := D_l(x_l^*, y) Q_l^\top(x_l^*, y) [\nabla_{xx}^2 \mathcal{H}(\bar{x}, y)]^{-1} Q_l(x_l^*, y)$  is a  $r_l \times r_l$  matrix.

# High-dimensional determinants (step 3)

Compute prefactor determinants `prefactor` using

1. the Taylor approximation of the energy  $\mathcal{H}$
2. the low-rank factorization of the constraint  $\Theta$

This can be done by introducing auxiliary optimization variables via a matrix relationship (see Appendix)

**Takeaway:** able to reduce failure rate sub-expressions to (complicated) closed-form expressions involving  $3 \times 3$  matrices

# Practical considerations (step 4)

To address warm-starts and infeasibility, the solution procedure is split into two phases:

1. load-shed determination
2. add  $\mathcal{R}$  constraints and candidate solve


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


**Figure:** Validation: KKT-approximated failure rates versus true failure rates for IEEE 118bus model with PGLib line limits at traditional ACOPF set-point


# Cascade prevention experiment procedure

- ▶ Determine a set-point  $y$  by enforcing  $\mathcal{R} \leq \epsilon^{\text{lim}}$  for various  $\epsilon^{\text{lim}}$
- ▶ Simulate sequences of line failures from the resulting set point using KMC
- ▶ Record time and load-still-served at each failure
- ▶ Repeat simulations across a range of parameters settings ( $\tau$ ,  $\Theta^{\text{max}}$ , and  $p_d, q_d$  load levels); below we show results over load level, known to be an important determinant of cascade risk

$$\tau = 2 \times 10^{-4}, \Theta^{\max} = 1.04 \times I^{\max}, p_d = 1.0 \times p_d^0, q_d = 1.0 \times q_d^0$$




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





$$\tau = 2 \times 10^{-4}, \Theta^{\max} = 1.04 \times I^{\max}, p_d = 1.1 \times p_d^0, q_d = 1.1 \times q_d^0$$




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$$\tau = 2 \times 10^{-4}, \Theta^{\max} = 1.04 \times I^{\max}, p_d = 0.9 \times p_d^0, q_d = 0.9 \times q_d^0$$



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# Shortcomings

- ▶ Cascades and failure rates are highly sensitive to  $\tau$ ; cascades are induced by using an artificially high temperature
- ▶ PGLib line limits are very high, leading to very low initial failure rates; we are in the process of considering an RTS96 case with limits that may reflect reality better

# Appendix

- ▶ Intermediate terms involved in  $\mathcal{R}$  are computable in closed form except for  $A_l$  which appears in the definition of  $W_l := I - \mu_l A_l$
- ▶ Skirt this issue by introducing  $Z_l \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times r_l}$  as follows:

$$\nabla_{xx}^2 \mathcal{H}(x, y) \cdot Z_l = Q_l(x_l^*, y), \quad (19)$$

and then setting  $A_l = D_l(x_l^*, y) Q_l^\top(x_l^*, y) Z_l$

- ▶ An alternative is to introduce explicit decision variables  $Z_l$  in the ACOPF formulation, along with its definition (19) as additional constraints. We implemented this alternative since it allows the complete rate constraint, including all of its intermediate expressions, to be computed analytically.